

## Message Text

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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
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AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1, 2

TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, XH

SUBJECT: CSCE: SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS FEEL PRESSURE  
AS BELGRADE CONFERENCE APPROACHES

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AND METHODS INVOLVED.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INR REPORT NO. 754, "CSCE: SOVIETS  
AND EAST EUROPEANS FEEL PRESSURE AS BELGRADE CONFERENCE  
APPROACHES," DATED MARCH 11, 1977. ANALYSIS IS FOR POSTS'  
INFORMATION ONLY AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT FULLY  
COORDINATED USG VIEWS.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE WEST'S GROWING CONCERN OVER THE HARASSMENT OF DISSIDENTS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION'S ACTIVE COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE INCREASED SOVIET FEARS THAT THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN BELGRADE LATER THIS YEAR MAY EVOLVE INTO A TRIBUNAL WITH THE EAST IN THE DOCK. SOVIET ANXIETIES IN THIS REGARD HAVE BEEN HIGHLIGHTED BY A STEPPED-UP PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN PARADING SOVIET ACCOMPLISHMENTS, DECRY-

ING WESTERN FAILINGS, AND DENOUNCING WESTERN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE "SOCIALIST" STATES.

3. HOWEVER MOSCOW'S STRATEGY FOR THE REVIEW CONFERENCE UNFOLDS--PRESUMABLY AT A WARSAW PACT COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING LATER THIS MONTH--THE SOVIETS UNDOUBTEDLY WILL STRESS THAT THERE WILL BE NO BOWING TO EITHER INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL PRESSURES. IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT AN AIRING OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AT THE CONFERENCE, THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO ADOPT A RIGID STANCE AT THE JUNE 15 PRELIMINARY MEETING IN BELGRADE, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO FIX THE DATE, AGENDA, AND MODALITIES FOR THE FORMAL REVIEW SESSION. END SUMMARY

4. BEGIN TEXT. THE SOVIETS AND THEIR WARSAW PACT ALLIES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY DEFENSIVE IN DISPUTING WESTERN CHARGES OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CSCE FINAL ACT SIGNED IN HELSINKI IN 1975, ESPECIALLY ITS PROVISIONS ON HUMAN CONTACTS (BASKET III). RECENT DEVELOPMENTS STRONGLY  
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SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS, IN PARTICULAR, ARE DETERMINED TO "HANG TOUGH," EVEN AT THE RISK OF HEIGHTENING THE POLEMICS IN ADVANCE OF THE BELGRADE MEETING:

(A)--THE WARSAW PACT DECLARATION ISSUED IN BUCHAREST IN NOVEMBER 1976, WHICH LABELED AS "HOSTILE" THE WEST'S POSITION ON BASKET III;

(B)--BREZHNEV'S EXHORTATION IN HIS TULA SPEECH OF JANUARY 17 THAT WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO PRESSURE "SOCIALIST COUNTRIES" ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WOULD BE "FUTILE";

(C)--THE PRAVDA ARTICLE OF FEBRUARY 12 AND SUBSEQUENT SOVIET COMMENTARIES ALLEGING THAT THE WEST'S SUPPORT FOR DISSIDENTS WAS AIMED AT BUTTRESSING ITS POSITION PRIOR TO BELGRADE, WOULD UNDERMINE DETENTE, AND COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT EFFORTS TO IMPROVE US-SOVIET RELATIONS;

(D)--THE SOVIETS' ARREST, OSTENSIBLY ON UNRELATED CHARGES,

OF PROMINENT LEADERS OF AN UNOFFICIAL GROUP ORGANIZED LAST MAY TO MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE CSCE FINAL ACT;  
AND

(E)--THE MEASURES TAKEN BY SOME EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES IN THEIR HANDLING OF DISSIDENTS, PARTICULARLY THE SUPPORTERS OF THE CHARTER 77 MOVEMENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

5. WARSAW PACT STRATEGY MEETING:

6. A PRIME TASK OF THE WARSAW PACT'S NEWLY FORMED COMMIT-

TEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS WHEN IT MEETS, REPORTEDLY SOME TIME THIS MONTH, WILL BE TO DEVISE A STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE WEST'S EXPECTED THRUST AT BELGRADE AGAINST THE EAST'S SHORTCOMINGS. IN THIS REGARD, SIGNS OF CONCERN AMONG WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES EMERGED DURING THE NOVEMBER  
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1976 MEETING IN BUCHAREST OF THE PACT'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. ACCORDING TO REPORTS, HUNGARY'S PARTY CHIEF KADAR APPARENTLY IMPLIED THAT THE EAST GERMAN AND CZECH LEADERSHIPS' HANDLING OF DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THEIR CSCE IMAGE--AN INDICATION THAT THE OSTENSIBLE CONFIDENCE OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES MAY HAVE WANED.

7. EVIDENCE TO DATE SUGGESTS THAT THE PACT COUNTRIES' BASIC STRATEGY WILL BE TO:

(A)--DEPICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE AS A LONG-TERM PROCESS, WITH EMPHASIS ON "POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS" SINCE HELSINKI;

(B)--OPPOSE ATTEMPTS TO GIVE PRIORITY TO ANY OF THE BASKETS OF THE FINAL ACT IN ORDER TO INHIBIT THE WEST FROM CHASTISING THE EAST IN AREAS WHERE ITS IMPLEMENTATION RECORD HAS BEEN POOR;

(C)--RESIST ANY WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING EXISTING COMMITMENTS TO BASKET III PROVISIONS OR EXPANDING THE PARAMETERS FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (E.G., REGARDING THE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS); AND

(D)--DEFLECT THE WEST'S EXPECTED FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES BY TABLING NEW PROPOSALS CALLING FOR A TREATY AMONG CSCE STATES ON THE NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A FREEZE ON MEMBERSHIPS IN BOTH NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT.

8. ELEMENTS OF THIS STRATEGY WERE IMPLICIT IN BREZHNEV'S

TULA SPEECH. HE CALLED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT, BUT--IN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO WESTERN CRITICS--NOTED THAT IT WAS "QUITE NATURAL THAT MORE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY NOW ALONG SOME DIRECTIONS" THAN OTHERS. HE WARNED THAT WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE RULES "INCOMPATIBLE  
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WITH SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY" WERE "FUTILE" AND URGED THAT THE COOPERATION ACHIEVED AT HELSINKI BE DEVELOPED FURTHER ON THE BASIS OF RECENT PROPOSALS BY THE "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES.

9. THUS, THE VIEW OF THE SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS THAT CSCE IMPLEMENTATION IS A LONG-TERM PROCESS WILL BE A CONSTANT IN THEIR STRATEGY FOR BELGRADE. THEIR ABILITY TO

AVOID SPECIFIC CHARGES OF NON-COMPLIANCE, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN SHORT-CIRCUITED BY THEIR OWN HARASSMENT OF DISSIDENTS AND BY THE APPARENT LACK OF CONSENSUS AMONG THEM IN THE HANDLING OF SUPPORTERS OF THE CHARTER 77 MOVEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, UNLIKE SOME OF THEIR ALLIES, THE HUNGARIANS AND POLES THUS FAR HAVE NOT CONDEMNED THEIR OWN INTELLECTUALS FOR SUPPORTING THE CZECHOSLOVAK CHARTER 77 MOVEMENT.

10. CONTINUED DISAGREEMENT AMONG PACT MEMBERS ON THE DISSIDENT ISSUE WAS SUGGESTED BY THE RESULTS OF A MEETING IN SOFIA ON MARCH 2-3 AMONG PARTY OFFICIALS FROM THE USSR, EASTERN EUROPE, CUBA, AND MONGOLIA. THE COMMUNIQUE ON THE MEETING STRESSED THE NEED FOR A STRONGER PROPAGANDA EFFORT TO COMBAT THE WEST'S "INTERFERENCE" IN THE EAST'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, BUT ITS REFERENCE TO THE CONFERENCE'S "EFFICIENT" ATMOSPHERE OF "EQUALITY" SUGGESTED DIVERGENCES IN VIEWS IN THE HANDLING OF INTERNAL DISSIDENCE.

11. THE DISSIDENCE PROBLEM PROBABLY WILL ALSO BE AIRED AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE PACT'S COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON CSCE STRATEGY. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ALL PACT COUNTRIES MET IN EAST BERLIN ON FEBRUARY 21-22 TO DISCUSS "INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST." THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS REPORTEDLY NOW COMPRISE THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE PACT'S RECENTLY RESUSCITATED SECRETARIAT, WHICH PRESUMABLY WILL DEVELOP THE AGENDA FOR THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.

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12. SOVIET POSITION ON CSCE--IN RETROSPECT:

13. PERHAPS THE MOST SINGULAR SOVIET ACCOMPLISHMENT REGARDING CSCE WAS THE FACT THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS HELD. MOSCOW FIRST PROPOSED A CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY IN 1954 BUT DID NOT REALIZE ITS OBJECTIVE UNTIL 1973, WHEN

(A)--IT FINALLY AGREED THAT THE CSCE AGENDA INCLUDE SUCH ISSUES AS THE FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, IDEAS, AND INFORMATION, AND MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS); AND

(B)--PROGRESS WAS OBTAINED ON OTHER INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS INVOLVING BERLIN AND ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR).

14. WHILE THE FINAL ACT SIGNED IN HELSINKI IN 1975--CULMINATING TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA--IS NOT EGALLY BINDING ON ANY OF THE 35 SIGNATORY STATES, THE SOVIETS IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-CSCE PERIOD SOUGHT TO IMPLY THAT IT WAS. THEY CLAIMED THAT CSCE SIGNIFIED A SUCCESS OF THEIR DETENTE POLICY AND SPARED NO RHETORIC IN ATTEMPT-

ING TO DEPICT THE FINAL ACT AS A SURROGATE FOR A WORLD WAR II PEACE TREATY: THEY STRESSED BASKET I PRINCIPLES DEALING WITH TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS BY FORCE, AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

15. ALTHOUGH THE WEST OFFICIALLY REJECTED SUCH INTERPRETATIONS, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE BASKET I PROVISIONS AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RESULTS OF CSCE. FOR EXAMPLE PRAVDA ON FEBRUARY 26 SOUGHT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THOSE PARTS OF THE FINAL ACT WHICH REQUIRED "UNCONDITIONAL" COMPLIANCE AND THOSE WHICH MERELY REGISTERED AN "INTENTION," E.G., BASKET III PROVISIONS.

16. THE SOVIETS' POSTURING AT THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS IN  
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GENEVA REVEALED THEIR SENSITIVITIES TO CBMS (BASKET I) AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES (BASKET III). THEIR DEFENSIVENESS IN THESE AREAS--WHICH HIGHLIGHTS THEIR SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CHARGES OF NON-COMPLIANCE--WAS UNDERSCORED BY THEIR:

(A)--INSISTENCE THAT THE PROVISIONS IN BASKET I FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS BE IMPLEMENTED ON A "VOLUNTARY BASIS"; AND

(B)--UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO MAKE THE PROVISIONS IN BASKET III SUBJECT TO "NATIONAL LAWS AND CUSTOMS."

17. THE BASKET II PROVISIONS, WHICH OUTLINED EAST-WEST

ECONOMIC-SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION, ARE LARGELY DEVOID OF IDEOLOGICAL COMPLICATIONS AND POSE NO MAJOR ANXIETIES FOR THE EAST. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIETS AND MOST OF THEIR ALLIES CAME TO VIEW THESE PROVISIONS AS PROMISING. THEY DID NOT SUCCEED, HOWEVER, IN OBTAINING A CLEAR-CUT AFFIRMATION OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION (MFN) TREATMENT, E.G., A PLEDGE ON THE LOWERING OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS AND OTHER NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO WESTERN IMPORTS FROM THE USSR AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (CEMA). THE ONLY MENTION OF MFN STATUS IS AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT BENEFICIAL EFFECTS FOR TRADE "CAN RESULT" FROM IT.

18. SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN CSCE PERFORMANCE:

19. THE SOVIET EUPHORIA IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-CSCE PERIOD WAS GRADUALLY REPLACED BY INSISTENCE THAT ALL SIGNATORIES SHOULD DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT "AS A WHOLE." THE WARSAW PACT DECLARATION OF NOVEMBER 1976

SPOKE OF THE RESULTS OF THE CSCE AS A "COMMON SUCCESS." IN CLAIMING THAT THE PRINCIPLES IN THE FINAL ACT HAD ALREADY BEEN "REALIZED," THE DECLARATION URGED THAT THE  
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THRUST OF THE BELGRADE MEETING SHOULD BE ON THE "POSITIVE EXPERIENCES OF COOPERATION" AND ON FUTURE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE SUCCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE.

20. AS EXPECTED, THE DECLARATION STAUNCHLY DEFENDED THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES' PERFORMANCE BY:

(A)--CITING THEIR CONFORMANCE WITH THE CBM PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT CALLING FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS AND THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS;

(B)--REITERATING THEIR INITIATIVES UNDER BASKET II ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION, E.G., BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL IN DECEMBER 1975 CALLING FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CEMA'S PROPOSAL IN FEBRUARY 1976 TO THE EC ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO ECONOMIC ENTITIES; AND

(C)--CHARACTERIZING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET III ON HUMAN CONTACTS AND INFORMATION AS "GOING WELL."

21. WITH RESPECT TO CBMS, THE SOVIETS HAVE TO DATE ISSUED NOTIFICATIONS AND INVITED A SMALL, BALANCED NUMBER OF NATO, WARSAW PACT, AND NEUTRAL OBSERVERS TO TWO MAJOR MANEUVERS,

CAUCASUS (JANUARY 1976) AND SEVER (JUNE 1976); (NOTE: THE SOVIETS ON MARCH 9 NOTIFIED CSCE SIGNATORIES OF AN EXERCISE PLANNED FOR MARCH 31-APRIL 5 INVOLVING APPROXIMATELY 25,000 TROOPS AND ANNOUNCED THAT THE MATTER OF OBSERVER INVITATION WOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY.) THE POLES HAVE SENT NOTIFICATIONS OF ONE MAJOR WARSAW PACT EXERCISE, SHIELD 76, IN SEPTEMBER 1976 (WITH OBSERVER INVITATIONS PATTERNED AFTER THOSE BY THE SOVIETS); AND THE HUNGARIANS HAVE NOTIFIED TWO MINOR EXERCISES INVOLVING LESS THAN 25,000 TROOPS, BUT WITHOUT INVITING OBSERVERS. (A MINOR SOVIET-HUNGARIAN EXERCISE IN HUNGARY IN FEBRUARY  
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1977 WAS NOT NOTIFIED BY THE HUNGARIANS.) WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES HAVE NOT ACCEPTED INVITATIONS TO NATO EXERCISES, A POINT THAT SOME IN THE WEST HAVE CONSTRUED AS AN INDICATION OF SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY. THE FINAL ACT, HOWEVER, DOES NOT OBLIGATE SIGNATORIES IN THIS RESPECT.

22. WHILE THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES HAVE WAXED ENTHUSIASTIC OVER THE UTILITY AND ADEQUACY OF CBMS AND THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH THEM, THEY--WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF ROMANIA--ACCEPTED CBMS ONLY GRUDGINGLY DURING THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS. NONETHELESS, BREZHNEV'S ATTEMPTS--IN AN INTERVIEW FOR FRENCH TV AND IN A SOVIET PARTY PLENUM SPEECH LAST OCTOBER--TO TAKE CREDIT FOR CBMS STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS REGARD CBMS AS A NON-CONTENTIOUS ISSUE.

23. SINCE THE WARSAW PACT DECLARATION, SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND MEDIA COMMENTARIES HAVE REFLECTED A GROWING RECOGNITION OF EASTERN VULNERABILITIES ON BASKET III. CERTAINLY THE DECLARATION'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET III PROVISIONS AS "GOING WELL" DOES NOT STAND UP IN LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, PACT COUNTRIES HAVE INCREASINGLY ATTEMPTED TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE BY ALLUDING TO A HOST OF RECENTLY CONCLUDED BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES REGARDING CULTURAL COOPERATION AND TO THE DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF WESTERN BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, AND FILMS AVAILABLE IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE. THE SOVIETS AND MOST OF THEIR ALLIES ARE, HOWEVER, HIGHLY VULNERABLE ON SUCH ISSUES AS THEIR HARASSMENT OF DISSIDENTS, CONTINUING RESTRICTIONS ON EMIGRATION, AND THE RECENT EXPULSION OF AN AP CORRESPONDENT.

24. SOVIETS PREPARED TO TAKE OFFENSIVE AT BELGRADE:

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25. TO MINIMIZE THEIR VULNERABILITY AT BELGRADE, THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES MAY BE EXPECTED TO PRESS FOR PROCEDURES TO HELP ENSURE A FOCUS ON THE "POSITIVE" ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION. DESPITE THE APPARENT UNANIMITY AMONG THEM ON SUCH AN OVERALL APPROACH, THE SOVIET TASK OF ACHIEVING A GENERALLY UNITED FRONT AT BELGRADE MAY BE HAMPERED BY THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME PACT COUNTRIES TO BECOME ENMESHED IN A MAJOR CLASH ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

26. IN THE INTERIM, THE SOVIETS MAY BE DRAWING SOME COMFORT FROM RECENT EFFORTS BY THE YUGOSLAVS, WHO, AS HOSTS FOR THE REVIEW CONFERENCE, ARE ALSO MINDFUL OF THEIR OWN VULNERABILITIES, E.G., A RECENT APPEAL TO A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TO ADJUDGE THE LEGALITY OF DENYING PASSPORTS TO SOME YUGOSLAVS, AND DJILAS' APPEAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. IN REPORTING ON YUGOSLAVIA'S RECENT CONSULTATIONS WITH SEVERAL EUROPEAN NON-ALIGNED/ NEUTRAL COUNTRIES, YUGOSLAV MEDIA ARE EMPHASIZING THAT THE

BELGRADE CSCE CONFERENCE SHOULD TAKE A "CONSTRUCTIVE" APPROACH AND REGARD THE FINAL ACT AS A "UNIFIED WHOLE"--A LINE IDENTICAL WITH THE SOVIET VIEW. IN TRYING TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION AT BELGRADE, THE SOVIETS MAY ALSO SEEK OUT THE SUPPORT OF THOSE CSCE STATES THAT HAVE BEEN LESS PUBLICLY OUTSPOKEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

27. WHILE THE SOVIETS AND MOST OF THEIR ALLIES MAY SUCCEED IN PUTTING A LID ON DISSIDENCE, THEY DO NOT APPEAR CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO PREVENT AN AIRING OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS AT BELGRADE. BASED ON THEIR REACTIONS TO WESTERN TREATMENT OF SUCH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE, THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO URGE THEIR ALLIES TO LAUNCH DAMAGE-LIMITING ACTIONS--ALONG LINES ALREADY CONVEYED RATHER EXPLICITLY IN RECENT PRAVDA AND TASS ACCOUNTS--SUCH AS:

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(A)--ACCUSING THE WEST OF ATTEMPTING TO UNDERMINE "POLITICAL DETENTE";

(B)--ALLEGING INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF "SOCIALIST COUNTRIES";

(C)--CLAIMING THAT DISSIDENTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE ARRESTED,



HAD VIOLATED LAWS HAVING NOTHING TO DO WITH HUMAN RIGHTS  
AND THAT THEY WERE IN THE SERVICE OF WESTERN REACTIONARY  
ELEMENTS;

(D)--ATTACKING ALLEGED WESTERN SHORTCOMINGS, E.G., THE  
US REFUSAL TO ISSUE VISAS TO SOVIET TRADE UNION  
OFFICIALS, US STATEMENTS ON COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION  
IN WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, BRITISH "POLICE  
ACTIONS" IN NORTHERN IRELAND; AND

(E)--DIVERTING ATTENTION TO MEASURES AIMED AT ACHIEVING  
"MILITARY DETENTE," E.G., THE RECENT PROPOSAL IN  
THE WARSAW PACT DECLARATION ON NON-FIRST-USE OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND CALLS TO COMPLEMENT POLITICAL  
DETENTE WITH MILITARY DETENTE.

28. WHATEVER STRATEGY THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES ADOPT  
IN THEIR PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE, THEY ALMOST ASSUREDLY  
WILL SEEK TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF SUCCUMBING TO  
EITHER INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL PRESSURES. SINCE ALL PACT  
COUNTRIES ARE VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM OF THEIR IMPLEMENTA-

TION RECORD, AND SINCE ALL FACE THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING  
POPULAR EXPECTATIONS IN SUCH AREAS AS FREE MOVEMENT, THERE  
WILL BE A STRONG INCENTIVE FOR THEM TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST A  
SEMBLANCE OF UNITY AT BELGRADE. END TEXT.  
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